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Motor skill and Moral Virtue 
Ellen Fridland 
King’s College London 
 
 
Virtue ethicists often appeal to practical skill as a way to clarify the nature of virtue.1 
An important commitment of a skill account of virtue is that virtue is learned 
through practice and not through study, memorization, or reflection alone.  This 
commitment has its roots in the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle’s states that, 
“What we need to learn to do, we learn by doing; for example, we become builders 
by building, and lyre players by playing the lyre. So too we become just by doing just 
actions, temperate by doing temperate actions and courageous by courageous 
actions” NE 1033 a 32-b2.   
 The way in which most virtue ethicists explain the requirement to practice is 
by considering the way in which right actions or right responses to moral situations 
are learned or acquired.  That is, most virtue ethicists hold something like the 
following view: learning which reaction or response to a moral situation is correct 
requires regularly performing the right actions in the right situations in childhood 
and beyond.  This is because in order to know how to respond appropriately, one 
has to learn how to respond appropriately, and this is learned by regularly 
instantiating the appropriate actions in the appropriate situations, rather than, say, 
just thinking or reflecting on or deliberating about what the right action in that 
situation may be. In functionalist or cognitive science terms, we might say that 
virtue ethicists appeal to practice in order to explain how agents are able to select 
the appropriate output given a particular input.   
               In what follows, I will argue that framing things in this way only gives us half 
the story. In particular, I will argue that focusing on outputs, or on the right actions 
or responses to moral situations, ignores a crucial facet of moral expertise.  Namely, 
that through practice, virtuous agents develop a cache of perceptual skills that allow 
them to attend to, detect, and identify the relevant features of a perceptual array, the 
selection of which is central to recognizing and categorizing a situation as a moral 
situation of a particular type. In order to support this claim, I will appeal to 
empirical studies in sports psychology, which show that an expert’s capacity to 
attend to and recognize relevant perceptual inputs differs in important respects 
from the layperson’s. Specifically, I will argue that performing the right action in the 
right circumstances improves an agent’s ability to attend to, identify, and make 
predictions based upon the morally relevant features of a moral situation.  
   In the first section of this paper, I will consider four explanations given by 
virtue ethicists in order to justify the claim that virtue is acquired through practice. I 
                                                        
1 See, for instance, Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); J. Annas, 
Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); J. McDowell, Mind Value and Reality 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); M. Stichter, ‘Ethical Expertise: The Skill Model of 
Virtue’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2007), 183 – 194; Stichter, M, ‘Virtues, Skills, and Right 
Action’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2011), 73-86. 
 
will emphasize that each of these explanations focus almost exclusively on the 
selection of outputs and ignore how developing the right attention to and selection 
of inputs is relevant to a full account of virtue. In the second section of the paper, I 
will present evidence from sports psychology strongly suggesting that experts 
locate, attend to, recognize, and make predictions based upon the relevant features 
of domain-specific perceptual arrays in ways that significantly differ from non-
experts. In section three, I will argue that if we take seriously the analogy between 
virtue and practical skill, then it is likely that performing virtuous actions tunes an 
agent’s attention to the morally relevant features of an ethical situation. That is, I 
will claim that performing the right action, at the right time, in the right way, 
directed at the right person, etc., is required for an agent to develop the capacity to 
detect a situation as a moral situation, to classify it as a moral situation of the right 
type, and to make accurate predictions based on the features that one detects. I will 
end by providing some cursory remarks about the kind of perception that I propose 
may be involved in the selection of inputs by morally virtuous agents.  
 
1. A look at the literature: 
As we turn to the literature on virtue ethics, we don’t need to look very far to see 
that most virtue ethicists focus almost exclusively on the way in which agents 
respond to ethical situations.  That is, virtue ethicists (along with other ethicists) are 
concerned primarily with explaining how an agent is able to determine and do the 
right thing, given the particular moral context in which the agent finds herself. Not 
many theorists are concerned with accounting for how agents attend to or recognize 
a situation as a moral situation in the first place.2  This seems to me to be an 
important oversight.  
In the following section, I will present four examples of discussions where 
virtue ethicists focus on one side of the perception-action divide.  To be clear, I will 
not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature but simply point 
to a few illustrative instances of the problem that I am attempting to identify. 
 
1.a. virtue and “giving an account” 
Julia Annas, like most virtue ethicists, holds that virtue is acquired through practice. 
She states, ‘Aristotle is right here: virtue is like building in that learning to be brave 
is learning to do something, we learn by doing it (not just by reading books about 
it)’.3 For Annas, while virtue is acquired by performing virtuous deeds, the 
performance of such deeds is by no means sufficient for virtue.4 At the heart of 
Annas’s account is a distinction between a subrational knack and a practical skill, of 
which virtue is an instance of the latter and simply performing virtuous actions is an 
                                                        
2 I will discuss exceptions to this generalization below. See especially: I. Murdoch, Sovereignty of Good 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1970) and L. Blum, ‘Moral Perception and Particularity’, Ethics, 
101(1991), 701-725. 
3 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 22-23 
4 ‘From the start then, the child will learn by copying the role model…But this will not lead to bravery, 
as opposed to foolish repetition’ (Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 23) and ‘virtue cannot be adequately 
understood just as a disposition to perform actions: the virtuous person is a person whose actions 
are performed for certain reasons’ (Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 28).  
example of the former. For Annas, skilled agents not only have the ability to perform 
virtuous actions, that is, the right action, directed at the right person, at the right 
time, in the right circumstance but they also understand why that action is the right 
action in a particular set of circumstances. Possession of this understanding thereby 
allows the virtuous agent to provide an explanation of why a particular action is the 
right action in a given context. 
As Annas explains, the virtuous agent has ‘the ability to convey why what is 
done is done’.5 
  
Indeed, just this serves to mark off skill (techne) from an inarticulate ‘knack; (emperia); the 
skilled person can ‘give an account; of what he does, which involves being able to explain 
why he is doing what he is doing…that virtue has these features, and that they are centrally 
important to what virtue is, is one of the main claims of the book (Annas, p. 20).  
 
For my purposes, the most important thing to notice about Annas’s account is that 
moral expertise turns out to be exclusively about reactions or responses to moral 
situations. After all, both doing the right thing in a particular context and being able 
to explain why that action is the right action in that context address only the output 
side of moral agency. For Annas, virtue is a practical skill that does not seem to 
involve refining one’s ability to attend to and identify the morally relevant features 
of a moral situation. As with so much of ethics, the input side of morality is taken as 
given.  
 
1b. virtue and the particularity of right actions 
A related suggestion for justifying the role of practice in moral expertise is that 
performing virtuous actions is required for the acquisition of virtue because 
identifying the right action cannot be articulated or organized into general 
principles. Rather, it is thought that virtue requires knowledge of what to do in 
particular situations, something that general rules or principles cannot capture.6  As 
Daniel Jacobsen writes, ‘the skill model implies that ethical expertise cannot be 
codified in principles’.7 And as John McDowell explains, 
 
[T]here need be no possibility of reducing virtuous behavior to rules.  In moral upbringing 
what one learns is not to behave in conformity with rules of conduct, but to see situations in 
a special light, as constituting reasons for acting; the perceptual capacity, once acquired can 
be exercised in complex novel circumstances, not necessarily capable of being foreseen and 
legislated for by a codifier of the conduct required by virtue, however wise and thoughtful 
he might be. 8 
 
                                                        
5 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 20. 
6 Likewise, Annas writes that, ‘the need to learn does justice to the fact that virtues are always 
learned in particular embedded contexts’ (Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 25). 
7 Jacobsen, D. ‘Seeing by feeling: Virtues, skills, and moral perception’, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 8 (2005), 387-409.  
8 McDowell, Mind, Value and Reality, 85 
We should notice that these accounts are concerned only with the impossibility of 
codifying rules for behavior or for translating reasons for action into general 
principles. That is, these accounts, like Annas’s above, are concerned with the 
impossibility of giving general rules for selecting appropriate outputs. But even if 
it’s true that the appropriate response to a given situation is impossible to codify 
into general principles, when it comes to moral expertise, this is only half the story.  
Standard accounts of virtue do not address the possibility that there’s likely 
another part of virtue that may be equally difficult or impossible to codify into 
general principles and that is also likely refined through practice—namely, the 
ability to detect, attend to, recognize, identify, and make predictions based upon the 
morally relevant features of a moral situation. Such attention to and identification of 
the morally relevant features of situations seems crucial for recognizing that one is 
confronted with a moral situation in the first place and also for categorizing or 
classifying that moral situation as a moral situation of a particular type. If this kind 
of identification and classification is necessary for moral expertise, as I will argue 
that it is, then we should conclude that accounts of virtue that focus primarily on 
outputs or responses to moral contexts, the nature of which is assumed to be given 
in one way or another, focus only on one half of what is required for a full account of 
moral virtue. 
 
1c. Virtue as a sensitivity to reasons for action 
Another suggestion for why practice is necessary for virtue comes from John 
McDowell.9 According to McDowell, virtue amounts to a sensitivity to reasons for 
action.10 On his view, this sensitivity or sensibility is akin to a perceptual capacity11 
but, importantly, it is not a perceptual capacity in the intuitionist sense. That is, the 
perceptual capacity that McDowell is concerned with is not a moral property or 
moral fact detector.12 Rather, according to McDowell, the features that the ethical 
                                                        
9 J. McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist 62 (1979), 331-350; J. McDowell, Mind Value and 
Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
10 ‘So the deliverances of this sensitivity constitute, one by one, complete explanations of the actions 
which manifest the virtue. Hence, since the sensitivity fully accounts for its deliverances, the 
sensitivity fully accounts for the actions. But the concept of the virtue is the concept of a state whose 
possession accounts for the actions which manifest it. Since that explanatory role is filled by the 
sensitivity, the sensitivity turns out to be what the virtue is’ (McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’, 332). 
See also, ‘the position I am describing aims…at an epistemology that centres on the notion of a 
susceptibility to reasons’ (McDowell, Mind, Value and Reality, 162). 
11 “The deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge; and there are idioms according 
to which the sensitivity itself can appropriately be described as knowledge: a kind person knows 
what it is like to be confronted with a requirement of kindness. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort 
of perceptual capacity” (McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’, 332). 
12 ‘Moreover, the primary-quality model turns the epistemology of value into mere mystification.  The 
perceptual model is no more than a model; perception, strictly so called, does not mirror the role of 
reason in evaluative thinking; which seems to require us to regard apprehension of value as an 
intellectual rather than a merely sensory matter. But if we are to take account of this, while 
preserving the model’s picture of values as brutely and absolutely there, it seems we need to 
postulate a faculty—intuition—about which all that can be said is that it makes us aware of objective 
rational connections; the model itself ensure that there is nothing helpful to say about how such a 
sensibility detects are reasons for action or ways of recognizing the demands that a 
situation places on us.13 Such an ethical sensitivity is like a perceptual capacity 
insofar as it detects features of the world and, when it does, it delivers knowledge. 
So, on McDowell’s view, as we develop virtue, we develop the capacity to see what 
action is called for in a particular situation. Insofar as this seeing is the detection of a 
reason, it also motivates one to perform the action that one sees as appropriate.  
 As with the cases above, McDowell emphasizes how an agent selects the 
appropriate outputs or responses to moral situations. The perceptual sensitivity 
that McDowell is concerned with delivers the ability to immediately sense what the 
right response to a given situation is. Importantly, this perceptual capacity is not 
identical to the ability to detect or identify features of moral situations. After all, on 
McDowell’s account, detecting that a situation has some morally relevant features is 
not sufficient for making that situation a reason for action. This is clear since, as 
McDowell explains,  
 
If a genuine virtue is to produce nothing but right conduct, a simple propensity to be gentle 
cannot be identified with the virtue of kindness. Possession of the virtue must involve not 
only sensitivity to facts about others' feelings as reasons for acting in certain ways, but also 
sensitivity to facts about rights as reasons for acting in certain ways; and when 
circumstances of both sorts obtain, and a certain stance of the second sort is the one that 
should be acted on, a possessor of the virtue of kindness must be able to tell that that is so. 
So we cannot disentangle genuine possession of kindness from the sensitivity, which 
constitutes fairness.14 
 
Now, it may be argued that a sensitivity to reasons for action requires a prior 
or simultaneous sensitivity to identifying and categorizing moral situations 
accurately—this seems reasonable and it’s a position that I’ll defend in section 3.  
However, for now, I’d like to highlight that accounting for how a sensitivity to moral 
situations develops is not equivalent to accounting for how a sensitivity to reasons 
for action develops. And it is the latter sensitivity that McDowell gives an account of. 
My aim is to develop a plausible account of the former.  
 
1d. virtue as automatic response  
A fourth reason that virtue theorists seem to have for holding that the acquisition of 
virtue requires practice and not just study or reflection is that the virtuous agent 
sees and does the right thing automatically. That is, the virtuous agent perceives 
what is required of her immediately, without having to consult rules or deliberate 
about general principles. So, though in the beginning stages of moral education, the 
virtuous agent is usually provided with general rules or heuristics that act as 
training wheels, through the process of acquiring ethical expertise, those general 
                                                                                                                                                                     
faculty might work, or why its deliverances might deserve to count as knowledge’ (McDowell, Mind, 
Value and Reality, 132-3).  
13 ‘In moral upbringing what one learns is not to behave in conformity with rules of conduct, but to 
see situations in a special light, as constituting reasons for acting; the perceptual capacity, once 
acquired can be exercised in complex novel circumstances…’ (McDowell, Mind, Value and Reality, 85). 
14 McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’, 333. 
rules fall away.  What is left is an internalized framework that transcends general 
principles and allows the agent to respond effectively and automatically to both the 
nuance and novelty of particular moral situations. 
As J. Jeremy Wisneiwski writes: 
 
 through repeated exposure to situations that involve moral action, even when these 
situations initially involve deliberation and judgment, we can develop the ability to respond 
immediately to the situation we perceive. The situation becomes “unitized” or “chunked,” 
and what once required cognitive effort becomes automatic and immediate.  …This is 
perhaps just another way of pointing out that repeated experience matters—that we 
learn—but what we learn to do is sometimes to perceive immediately the essential nature 
of particular situations, and this can involve immediate recognition of the kind of action 
called for by the situation. 15 
 
And as Jacobsen writes, 
 
 The novice is given some handy rules, such as: “think how you would feel if someone said 
that to you.” As one learns to be kind, though, these heuristics eventually give way to 
something like a perceptual capacity. 16 
 
And Annas, too, agrees that this as relevant aspect of virtue:  She writes  
 
[T]he reasons have left their effect on the person’s disposition, so that the virtuous response 
is an intelligent one while also being immediate and not one that the person needs to 
consciously figure out.17 
 
But as with the above considerations for why practice is required for the acquisition 
of virtue, what becomes automatic and immediate, according to these theorists, is 
the right response or the selection of the appropriate output in a moral situation. 
That is, the rules that a novice is given are rules about right actions. Accordingly, the 
proposal is that those rules are internalized in such a way as to guide, in a subtle and 
flexible manner, responses to particular, embedded moral circumstances. However, 
as we’ve already seen in previous examples, nothing is said about how practice 
develops automatic, perceptual skills for attending to and identifying moral 
situations in the first place. That is, the input side of selecting the morally relevant 
features of a moral situation is almost completely overlooked. And even when 
perceptual capacities are invoked, as they are by Wisniewski and Jacobsen, they are 
perceptual skills of the McDowell variety: that is, capacities to perceive appropriate 
responses.  
 Just to be clear, my claim here is not that the above accounts of virtue are 
incompatible with a view that emphasizes the importance of practice for acquiring 
the perceptual skills needed for selecting and identifying the morally relevant 
                                                        
15 J.J. Wisniewski, ‘The case for moral perception’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 
14(2015), 129-148. 
16 Jacobson, ‘Seeing by feeling: Virtues, skills, and moral perception, 393 
17 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 30. 
properties of particular situations. Rather, I am simply illustrating that standard 
accounts of virtue miss this feature of moral expertise and, as such, provide us with 
an incomplete picture of virtue and its acquisition.  That is, by focusing on outputs 
or responses alone, standard accounts of moral expertise overlook the importance 
of practice in refining an agent’s ability to select and identify appropriate moral 
inputs. Selecting appropriate inputs and identifying them veridically, as I’ll argue 
below, is required if an agent is going to be able to respond to those inputs 
appropriately. After all, if one is unable to detect and categorize a situation as a 
moral situation in the first place, then it is unlikely that she’ll be able to respond to 
that situation at all, never mind have the ability to respond to it appropriately.  
 
2. Expertise and Motor Skill 
In this section, I will present empirical evidence from sports psychology strongly 
suggesting that experts differ from non-experts in at least three ways when it comes 
to the selection of perceptual input:  (1) experts and non-experts differ in the ways 
in which they attend to the same perceptual array, (2) Experts and non-experts 
recognize and thus recall different domain-specific patterns or properties of a 
perceptual array, and (3) experts and non-experts differ in the way in which they 
use information. That is, experts are able to use early visual cues to make quicker 
and more accurate predictions than non-experts.  
The reason that these differences are important comes down to how 
seriously we want to take the analogy between virtue and practical skill. At the very 
least, it seems reasonable to hold that if virtue really is a kind of practical skill, then 
what studies of motor expertise prove is that experts select and organize inputs in 
categorically different ways from non-experts. This should force us think about how 
moral experts may attend, identify, and make predictions based on perceptual 
information in ways that differ significantly from those who lack moral expertise. In 
short, on the account that I am recommending, we need to take seriously the 
possibility that moral experts perceive the world differently from moral novices. 
This applies not only to expert decision-making or the selection of appropriate 
responses (the perception of affordances for moral action, one may say), but when it 
comes to the expert’s abilities to detect, recognize, and categorize situations as 
moral situations in the first place.  What I am suggesting is that experts and non-
experts literally see the world differently and it is this difference that we must take 
into consideration of if we are to have a complete account of virtue.  
 
2a. Expert attention 
In examining the sports psychology literature on motor expertise, one feature that 
emerges across multiple domains and decades of research is that experts develop 
the capacity to effectively allocate attention for efficient information pick-up in ways 
that differ systematically from non-experts.  Specifically, differences have emerged 
in the visual search strategies that experts employ when looking at a perceptual 
array. The plausible background assumption here is that looking to a particular 
location is importantly connected to attending to that location and retrieving 
information from the location where one looks. Before presenting the evidence from 
studies on motor skill and attention, I’d like to note that though attention is a 
complex phenomenon, the way in which I am using the term here, very generally, is 
to refer to the cognitive process responsible for selection. That is, I am concerned 
with attention as a process of filtering or highlighting features or targets of an action 
space insofar as they that are relevant for guiding, controlling, or otherwise 
contributing to a task or activity.18 
It’s important to notice that attention can be very roughly divided into two 
kinds: top-down and bottom-up. As Wayne Wu explains, top-down attention is 
endogenously deployed; it is attention that ‘can be intentionally directed as when 
one looks for a missing object’ whereas bottom-up attention is stimulus-driven. It is 
‘attention that is captured as when a loud sound pulls one’s focus to it’.19 Though 
bottom-up attention may be relevant to expertise, at least insofar as one can 
conceive of an expert’s attention being captured by an unexpected event or stimulus 
relevant for successful task instantiation while the novice fails to notice the same 
event or feature, the studies that I will consider below will be concerned with top-
down attention. That is, the studies will consider how an agent, herself, directs her 
attention in various ways to the relevant features of a perceptual array. In what 
follows, I will sometimes refer to top-down attention as selective attention.20  
Over the past three decades, evidence concerning motor expertise has 
converged on the fact that experts attend to sports-specific perceptual arrays in 
ways that differ in significant and systematic ways from the ways in which non-
experts attend to the same stimuli.  As Mann et al. write in their meta-analytic 
review, it has been found that ‘experts differ from non-experts… on sport specific 
measures of attention allocation and information pick-up’.21 Specifically, it has been 
found that experts employ fewer visual fixations than non-experts (inter alia they 
attend to fewer locations) and those fixations last for longer periods of time than the 
visual fixations of non-experts. As such, we can say that the selective attention of 
experts differs from that of non-experts along at least three dimensions: frequency, 
location, and duration. 22 23  
 Evidence of attentional differences between experts and non-experts has 
                                                        
18 W. Wu, Attention (New York: Routledge, 2014), 11.   
19 Wu, Attention, 11. More formally: ‘S’s attention to X is top-down  if and only if S’s attention to x 
involves the influence of non-perceptual psychological state/capacity for its occurrence” and “S’s 
attention to X is bottom-up  if and only if S’s attention to X did not involve a non-perceptual 
psychological state/capacity for its occurrence’ (Wu Attention, 30). 
20 Selective attention can be defined as: the ‘preferential detection, identification and recognition of 
selected stimulations’ (D.L. Woods, ‘The physiological basis of selective attention: Implications of 
event related potential studies’, in J.W. Rohrbaugh, R. Parasurasman and R. Johnson (eds.), Event-
Related Brain Potentials (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 178. 
21 D. Mann, A.M. Williams, P. Ward, & C.M. Janelle, ‘Perceptual-Cognitive Expertise in Sport: A Meta-
Analysis’,  Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology 29 (2007), 457-478, 459. 
22 Mann et al., ‘Perceptual-Cognitive Expertise in Sport: A Meta-Analysis’, 460 
23 In these studies, it is assumed that visual fixation is a sign of attention. For instance, as Just and 
Carpenter write: ‘The more information which has to be processed, the longer the fixation duration.’(M.A. 
Just and P.A. Carpenter, ‘Eye fixations and cognitive processes’, Cognitive Psychology 8 (1976), 441–
80). Though, not without its problems, this interpretation seems plausible. For problems see chapter 5 of 
A.M. Williams, K. Davids, and J.G. Williams, Visual perception and action in sport (New York: 
Routledge, 1999). 
accumulated for decades. For instance, in studying basketball, Bard and Fleury24 
found that:  
 
The eye movement data indicated that significantly fewer fixations were used prior to a 
response by expert basketballers (M = 3.3) than novices (M = 4.9). Also, differences were 
found in the distribution of visual fixations to selected areas of the display. Novices fixated 
primarily on a receiving team-mate when deciding to pass, while experts fixated additional 
sources of information such as the position of the nearest defender and the space available 
between the defender and basket.25 
 
And when studying expert soccer players, the results of Tyldesley et al 26 
 
showed that the experienced players responded significantly faster than the inexperienced 
players to the soccer-specific stimuli. Moreover, visual search data revealed that when 
viewing a right-footed player strike the ball, the experienced players did not fixate on either 
the supporting leg or any part of the left side of the body. Their scanning behaviour was 
more structured and consistent than the novices with fixations being restricted to the right 
side of the body and the shooting leg.27 
 
The above observations have been confirmed across a range of sports domains 
including basketball,28soccer,29 fencing, and table tennis.30 In sum, as Williams et al. 
write in their review of the literature on motor expertise and visual search:   
 
Finally, many other studies have identified differences in visual search strategy using film-
                                                        
24 C. Bard & M. Fleury, M. ‘Analysis of visual search activity during sport problem situations’, Journal 
of Human Movement Studies 3(1976), 214–22. 
25 Williams et al., Visual perception and action in sport, 157 
26 D.A. Tyldesley, R.J. Bootsma,  & G.T. Bomhoff, ‘Skill level and eye movement patterns in a sport 
orientated reaction time task’, in H.Rieder, H. Mechling and K. Reischle (eds) Proceedings of an 
International Symposium on Motor Behaviour: Contribution to Learning in Sport (Cologne: Hofmann, 
1982). 
27 Williams et al., Visual perception and action in sport, 158 
28 C. Bard,  & L. Carriere, ‘Etude de la prospection visuelle dans des situations problèmes en sports’,  
Mouvement 10 (1975), 15–23;  C. Bard, & M. Fleury, ‘Analysis of visual search activity during sport 
problem Situations’,  Journal of Human Movement Studies 3(1976), 214–22; C. Bard. & M. Fleury, 
‘Considering eye movement as a predictor of attainment’, in  I.M. Cockerill & W.W.MacGillvary (eds) 
Vision and Sport (Cheltenham: Stanley Thornes, 1981); C. Bard, M. Fleury, & L. Carriere, ‘La stratègie 
perceptive et la performance motrice: Actes du septième symposium canadien en apprentissage 
psychomoteur et psychologie du sport’, Mouvement 10 (1976), 163–83. 
29 Tyldesley et al., ‘Skill level and eye movement patterns in a sport orientated reaction time task’; W. 
Helsen, & J.M. Pauwels, ‘A cognitive approach to visual search in sport’, in D. Brogan and K. Carr (eds) 
Visual Search vol. II (London: Taylor and Francis, 1992); W. Helssen, & J.M. Pauwels, ‘The relationship 
between expertise and visual information processing in sport’, in J.L. Starkes and F. Allard (eds) 
Cognitive Issues in Motor Expertise (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1993); A.M. Williams, & K. Davids, 
‘Eye movements and visual perception in sport’, Coaching Focus 26 (1994), 6–9; C. Bard, Y. 
Guezennec & J.P. Papin, ‘Escrime: Analyze de l’exploration visuelle’, Medicine du Sport 15 (1981), 
117–26; H. Hasse, & H. Mayer, ‘Optische orientierungsstrategien von fechtern’ (Strategies of visual 
orientation of fencers) Leistungssport 8 (1978), 191–200. 
30 H. Ripoll, H. ‘Uncertainty and visual search strategy in table tennis’, Perceptual and Motor Skills 68 
(1989), 507–12. 
based methods. For example, proficiency-related differences have been noted in tennis,31 
volleyball,32 baseball, 33and French boxing.34 These studies have demonstrated differences 
in the allocation of fixations to selected areas of the display and, generally, have indicated 
some disparity in search rates between skill groups. 35 
 
It seems reasonable to interpret the above evidence in the following way: 
first, when it comes to understanding why experts fixate on fewer locations than 
non-experts, we can attribute this to the fact that experts know where to look.  That 
is, experts know where the most rich and relevant sources of information in a 
perceptual array are to be found and, accordingly, they turn their attention directly 
to those areas. This allows experts to fix their attention to fewer places than novices 
who search for relevant information throughout a perceptual array and, as such, are 
less efficient in their capacity to allocate attention to only the most relevant visual 
locations for detecting task-relevant stimuli.  In short, we can say that experts look 
to different locations than non-experts—experts look only to the most relevant, 
information-rich locations. And experts look to fewer places than non-experts, that 
is, they ignore the irrelevant or information-poor locations or features of domain-
specific visual arrays.36 
 Further, once experts have developed efficient search strategies, focusing 
their attention only on the most relevant perceptual locations given their aims, they 
also spend more time looking at those locations. That is, expert visual fixations have 
been found to be, in general, longer than non-expert visual fixations.37 It seems 
reasonable to interpret this fact as indicating that experts fixate for longer so that 
they can pick-up more information from those task-relevant, information-rich areas. 
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As such, we see that experts are extracting more information from the task-relevant 
areas of a visual presentation than their non-expert counterparts.   
It seems that these features of expert attention and perception are likely 
relevant for feeding into the successful follow-on processes of decision-making and 
action selection that experts employ. Presumably, these processes are relevant not 
only in allowing the expert more time for decision-making (because visual fixation is 
efficient) but also for providing the expert with the information she needs for 
selecting an appropriate response (because visual fixation is effective). 
 These finding are doubly important because they apply across skills and 
domains of expertise.38 That is, at least when it comes to motor skill, it appears that 
‘all contexts require athletes to focus attention on the most appropriate cues so as to 
perform effectively’.39 And what the studies on selective attention show, very 
generally, is that the ‘skilled performer knows the important information within the 
display and can focus attention on relevant and ignore irrelevant sources of 
information’.40 Though the skilled performer excels only within her domain of 
expertise, across domains, the differences between experts and non-expert in sport 
are more or less consistent. 
These differences in the attentional capacities of experts and non-experts are 
instructive since it seems at least possible that we’ll be able to generalize from 
motor expertise in particular to expertise in general. Surely, this kind of 
extrapolation requires empirical support, but if one thinks, as the virtue ethicist 
does, that virtue is a species of practical skill and we have seen consistently, across a 
wide-range of practical skills, that there are dramatic changes in a skilled athlete’s 
ability to attend appropriately to domain-specific regions of a perceptual array, then 
it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that such a capacity develops in moral 
expertise as well.   
 
2b. The identification/recognition of patterns 
A second important difference between expert and non-expert input selection is 
reflected in the fact that experts are able to recognize and recall complex domain-
specific perceptual patterns more quickly and effectively than non-experts.  This is 
thought to be due to the experts superior abilities of encoding (organizing and 
storing) and retrieving (accessing) domain-specific information.41 Studies in the 
“recall and recognition” paradigms have shown consistent differences in perceptual 
recognition and recall across a wide array of domains of expertise from chess to 
gymnastics, volleyball, basketball, American football, snooker, and others.42  
The seminal study in this paradigm was conducted by deGroot in 1965.43 
Studying chess players at various level of skill from Grand Master to club player, 
DeGroot  showed that:  
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When chess masters were shown a game configuration for intervals of 5 to 10 seconds, they were able 
to recall the position of chess pieces almost perfectly from memory. In contrast, this ability dropped 
off very rapidly below the master level, from a recall accuracy of 93% to a value of 51% for club 
players.44 
 
Of course, from this finding alone it is unclear which capacities expert chess players 
possess that non-experts lack. And based on this evidence alone, one might guess 
that Grand Masters have generally superior powers of perception or memory. 
However, this possibility was ruled out by Chase and Simon,45 who improved on de 
Groot’s study by including ‘a control condition where chess pieces were arranged 
randomly on the board rather than in a structured fashion. In this condition, there 
were no differences between a Grand Master, A level and Club player’.46 
What this shows, and what many studies in various domains have since 
replicated, is that the expert chess players possess neither superior perceptual nor 
mnemonic abilities. That is, Grand Masters are no better than novices at recognizing 
or recalling perceptual patterns, in general. Their superior skill comes from their 
ability to recognize and recall meaningful, chess-related configurations.  As such, we 
can conclude that the superior memory of the Grand Master is domain-specific. That 
is, the Grand Master has domain-specific knowledge or skill that allows him to 
effectively encode and retrieve chess-related information more efficiently than more 
novice players. This is not a general skill that applies to perceptual pattern-
recognition or recall at large. 
From the recognition and recall paradigm alone, it is difficult to isolate where 
exactly the perceptual-cognitive advantage of the expert lies. That is, we can be 
certain that the advantage is domain-specific, but it is unclear whether the domain-
specific superiority is in information retrieval or in information encoding or in both. 
Sports scientists usually interpret the results as indicating more efficient encoding 
and retrieval (as I do above).47 As Williams et al. write in their review of the recall 
and recognition studies:  
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 Findings showed that experts are able to take in more information in a single glance than less skilled 
players because their knowledge allows them to chunk or group information into larger and more 
meaningful units. Grouping the discrete stimuli in this manner can result in emergent features that are 
not evident if the stimuli are viewed in isolation. That is, their ability to chunk items (i.e. players’ 
positions) into larger and more meaningful units (i.e. patterns of play) enables them to recognise a 
developing pattern of play early in its initiation, thus facilitating anticipation.48 
 
This interpretation seems reasonable since in the absence of a generally superior 
memory capacity it would seem that the way in which information is encoded is key 
to making it easily accessible for retrieval. Further, given the systematic difference 
in visual fixation that I reviewed in the previous section, it seems unlikely that the 
novice encodes and stores the same information as the expert but only fails to recall 
it. This is doubly unlikely since studies of perceptual learning show that with 
training and practice, individuals become able to detect perceptual patterns that are 
unitized into meaningful components.49 For instance, with training, the radiologist 
detects patterns of visual information that the layperson misses.50 And the skilled 






In short, training allows patterns to emerge that would otherwise remain 
undetectable to the unpracticed individual. As such, combining (1) the plausible 
assumption that the way in which information is stored effects the ease with which 
it is accessed with (2) evidence that expert’s attend to perceptual arrays in ways 
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that are systematically different from non-experts and adding (3) evidence that 
through perceptual learning, individual’s refine their capacity to detect complex 
patterns or properties, it seems safe to conclude that experts differ from non-
experts both in their ability to recognize various significant features or patterns of a 
domain-specific perceptual array and also excel at retrieving those relevant 
perceptual configurations from memory efficiently.  
 Returning to virtue, as above, if we want to take the parallel between 
practical skill and virtue seriously, then it seems that we should attribute to the 
moral expert the capacity to recognize and recall perceptual features or patterns 
that remain undetectable to the layperson. This may go for recognizing that one is in 
a moral situation in the first place, for instance, recognizing that one is encountering 
injustice or wrongdoing of some kind or other. Or it may go for detecting and 
identifying that one is in a moral situation of a particular type, for instance, 
encountering a situation of racism or sexism. Or, perhaps, it may contribute to the 
recognition and classification of a moral situation by allowing one to recognize 
various morally relevant properties, for instance, that a person is in pain or 
discomfort. The latter interpretation is the one I favor and about which I will say 
more below. For now, we should simply keep in mind that because recognizing and 
categorizing situations seems relevant for influencing follow-on deliberation and 
appropriate response selection, it would behoove us not to overlook this important 
stage of moral expertise.  
 
2c.  Experts and early detection of perceptual cues 
A third distinction between experts and non-experts that becomes apparent when 
reviewing the literature on motor expertise is that experts are able to use earlier 
perceptual cues than non-experts in order to anticipate the movements or actions of 
sport-relevant objects and persons. Studies across the board have shown that 
experts are quicker at detecting various sport-specific movements and more 
accurate at predicting the results of those movements.  An illustrative example 
recounted by Williams, et al. reveals the expert capacity to detect and use early cues 
in tennis. In any early study, 
 
Jones and Miles (1978)52 initially used this paradigm to investigate whether tennis players and non-
players could successfully anticipate the direction of an opponent’s serve. Three different temporal 
occlusion periods were used: 336 ms after the impact of the ball on the racket (condition A), 126 ms 
after impact (condition B) and 42 ms before impact (condition C). Subjects included county or 
international tennis players, club level players and undergraduate students with no tennis experience. 
Subjects reported their perceptual predictions by indicating where they thought the ball would land on 
a diagrammatic representation of the service court area which was divided into three sections. The 
results showed that there were significant differences between the players and non-players in 
conditions B and C, whilst no differences were found in condition A… Differences between groups 
were greater in condition C, when more potential information was withheld. Furthermore, the results 
indicated that the players scored significantly better than chance (i.e. 33.33% success rate) in 
condition C, signifying that skilled tennis players are able to effectively use information available 
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prior to ball/racket impact in the tennis serve.53 
 
The capacity to rely on early cues has been widely established in a wide variety of 
sporting domains. As Mann et al. write: 
 
Both temporal and spatial occlusion techniques have been employed to systematically demonstrate 
expert/nonexpert differences in the use of information presented early in the visual display across a variety 
of sports, including tennis, badminton, squash, cricket, baseball, and volleyball.54 A summary of these 
experiments suggests that (1) experts are better able to predict the direction and force of an opponent’s 
stroke based on kinematic information that maintain subtle clues (such as the dominant arm of a tennis 
player)55 and (2) experts are more adept than nonexperts at using early flight cues to predict the ball’s end 
location. These findings have been relatively consistent, signifying the attunement of expert-level 
performers to advance cues otherwise neglected by nonexpert performers56.57 
 
When we return to thinking about virtue as a kind of practical skill, then it becomes 
clear that the early and accurate detection of morally relevant cues will be 
important for responding appropriately to situations in real time. In sport, 
‘perceptual anticipation is essential… because inherent limitations in the performer’s 
reaction time and movement time would result in decisions being made too late to 
provide an effective counter’.58 Though some moral situations are such that time-
pressure exerts very little force (i.e., correcting a historical wrong-doing), others 
require, like in sport, ‘thinking on one’s feet’ or reacting on the spot.  
As an example of the kind of situation that requires a real-time response, we 
can think of something familiar to us all: sitting in a café or restaurant or bar and 
overhearing someone being verbally abused. Let’s say that the appropriate response 
to this situation is to intervene on behalf of the less powerful individual.59 If this is 
the right response, then one has to implement it in a timely manner. One cannot 
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wait around until after the two leave to do something.  Or, for a situation that may 
hit closer to home: one may find oneself at a conference dinner where a senior 
academic is making racist or sexist or other off-color remarks to a table full of junior 
scholars. Or, one may find oneself at drinks where the keynote speaker is making 
sexual advances towards a younger colleague, who clearly looks uncomfortable with 
the attention (I know, in philosophy, never!). These situations not only call for 
intervention but the intervention needs to be implemented in a timely manner. In 
such situations, one doesn’t have the luxury of going home, calling friends for advice, 
deliberating about all the options, and then reflecting some more. The particular 
situation calls for an appropriate response at that particular moment. As such, the 
better one is at using early cues for assessing and predicting the likely unfolding of 
events, the more time one will have for choosing an appropriate response and the 
more time this will leave one to implement one’s decided course of action. 
 
2d. Taking stock 
To close, As Pylyshyn writes:60  
 
[the] skill to direct attention in a task-relevant manner is documented in what is perhaps 
the largest body of research on expert perception—the study of performance in sports. It is 
obvious that fast perception, as well as quick reaction, is required for high levels of sports 
skill. Despite this truism, very little evidence of faster visual information processing has 
been found among athletes.61 In most cases the difference between sports novices and 
experts is confined to the specific domains in which the experts excel—and there it is 
usually attributable to the ability to anticipate relevant events. Such anticipation is based, 
for example, on observing initial segments of the motion of a ball or puck or the opponents 
gestures.62 Except for a finding of generally better attention-orienting abilities,63 visual 
expertise in sports, like the expertise found in the Chase and Simon studies of chess skill, 
appears to be based on the nonvisual abilities related to the learned skills of identifying, 
predicting and therefore attending to the most relevant places.64  
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Generalizing these findings to thinking about virtue as a practical skill puts pressure 
on the virtue ethicist to consider seriously how it is that moral experts detect and 
use relevant perceptual inputs in order to organize and understand the situations 
they encounter. Further, it is important to think about how moral experts use their 
abilities at identifying, categorizing, and predicting in order to facilitate the selection 
of the most appropriate response to an encountered moral situation. It seems to me 
that if the analogy between virtue and skill is going to be informative, then it is vital 
that this aspect of virtue be addressed. Of course, the virtue ethicist may double-
down and claim that moral situations are presented to experts and novices alike and 
that the only difference is in the action selection or recognition of reasons for action. 
However, if this is the position that one chooses, then it must be acknowledged that 
the similarity between virtue and practical skill begins to break down.  And it should 
also be acknowledged that moral perception would be a very strange kind of 
perception indeed, since even simple visual arrays admit of an infinite number of 
interpretations.65 
 
3. Is the detection and identification of moral situations really important for virtue? 
 
Though, for the most part, theorists have overlooked the importance of perceptual 
input selection, detection, identification and categorization for moral expertise, 
there are a few exception who have made the case that moral perception, insofar as 
it is addresses how “a situation come[s] to have a particular character for a 
particular moral agent” is central to questions of ethics. This position was advocated 
by Iris Murdoch in The Sovereignty of Good66 and it has since been defended by 
Lawrence Blum.67  
Blum writes: 
Moral philosophy’s customary focus on action-guiding rules and principles, on choice and 
decision, on universality and impartiality, on obligation and right action have masked the 
importance of moral perception to a full and adequate depiction of moral agency. An agent 
may reason well in moral situations, uphold the strictest standards of impartiality for 
testing her maxims and moral principles, and be adept at deliberation. Yet unless she 
perceives moral situations as moral situations, and unless she perceives their moral 
character accurately, her moral principles and skill at deliberations will be for nought and 
may even lead her astray. In fact, one of the most important moral differences between 
people is between those who miss and those who see various moral features of situations 
confronting them.68 
 
The take-away point here is that even the best deliberator or decision-maker will 
not be a moral agent if she does not recognize the times at which she ought to 
deliberate, make decisions, or respond to a moral situation. That is, if one goes about 
one’s life barely noticing when one is confronted with a moral situations then no 
amount of diligence in following principles (even internalized, automatic, situational 
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ones) and no ability to articulate why a given action is the right action can be 
sufficient to guarantee that the agent will actually employ these principles or 
abilities in the situations in which they are called for. That is, if one does not have 
the capacity to detect that one is confronted with a moral situation and if one is 
unable to accurately identify the character of that situation when one is confronted 
with it, then even the most astute moral deliberator will not be able to respond 
appropriately to that moral situation. 
To see how ubiquitous the need for accurate perception of moral situations 
is, we can look to the following mundane situation that Blum introduces: 
 
John and Joan are sitting riding on a subway train.  There are no empty seats and some 
people are standing; yet the subway car is not packed so tightly as to be uncomfortable for 
everyone.  One of the passengers standing is a woman in her thirties holding tow relatively 
full shopping bags.  John is not particularly paying attention to the woman, but he is 
cognizant of her. 
 
Joan, by contrast, is distinctly aware that the woman is uncomfortable. Thus, different 
aspects of the situation are “salient” for John and Joan.  That is, what is fully and explicitly 
present to John’s consciousness about the woman is that she is standing holding some bags; 
but what is in that sense salient for Joan is the woman’s discomfort.69 
 
One can see that even if one has internalized a more or less general principle that 
one ought to, when one can, offer help to someone who is in discomfort but one also 
lacks the ability to detect when another person is in discomfort then this kind of 
internalized principle, even if it is automatic and nuanced, will be useless. That is, if 
the appropriate response is not triggered by the identification of a matching 
situation, then one will not act morally. 70 After all, as Blum explains of Joan and 
John: 
 
the deficiency lies not only in[John’s] failure to act. For we can contrast with John someone 
who does perfectly clearly perceive other people’s discomfort but is totally unmoved by it: 
he simply does not care and this is why he does not offer to help. John, as I am envisioning 
him, is not callous and uncaring in this way. We can imagine him as someone who, when 
other’s discomfort is brought to his attention, is as sympathetic and willing to offer help as a 
person of average moral sensitivities. His failure to act stems from his failure to see (with 
the appropriate salience), not from callousness about other people’s discomfort.71 
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I take it that we all know this kind of person: the one who doesn’t notice things that 
she should and then apologizes profusely for not doing the right thing. In some 
ways, I have to admit that I find this person even more infuriating than the 
individual that just doesn’t care. This is because, somehow, this ‘John’ kind of person 
has let himself off the hook for being aware of what’s going on around him but feels 
totally secure in his moral standing—that he would do the moral thing, had he 
noticed. Clearly, however, noticing the right things, that is, being sensitive to the 
right features of the world, is central to being a moral agent in the first place. In this 
way, moral education and moral virtue requires agents not only that one do the 
right thing, if one notices that that thing is required, but to pay attention properly: to 
become aware of one’s own surroundings, to notice others, to be properly engaged 
with the world. Without this kind of attunement, without the proper situational 
awareness real moral virtue is unattainable.  
Another facet of detecting and identifying moral situations that seems 
relevant for moral expertise is identifying moral situations accurately. It seems clear 
enough that if one is confronted with a situation that one identifies as having 
morally-relevant features of S experiencing fear (let’s say, as the result of another’s 
speech acts) when in fact the situation is one in which S is experiencing humiliation 
then when one responds to this situation (let us suppose that the situation warrants 
a response), it will be very difficult to respond appropriately. After all, the proper 
reaction to a person who has been made to feel fear, presumably, is different from 
the proper reaction to a person who has been humiliated. As such, once again, we 
see that identifying and categorizing moral situations appropriately is crucial for 
responding to those situations appropriately. In this way, we see a natural parallel 
in moral expertise to the recognition and recall paradigm of motor skill discussed 
above. 
 Lastly, it appears to be a straightforward constraint on moral expertise that 
the virtuous agent not only act when a response is warranted and act in the right 
way, but also, act at the right time.72  The early detection of morally relevant cues is 
implicated in this latter requirement. This should be obvious since, as I indicated 
above, there is at least an important set of moral situations (arguably, the most 
important set of moral situations), which involve real-time responses. They require 
saying or doing the right thing en situ. This may require intervention on behalf of a 
more vulnerable individual or, for instance, signaling that certain speech acts or 
behaviors are unwelcome and will not be tolerated. Such intervention and early 
signaling require predicting another’s intentions and responding before a harm has 
been committed. In this way, early detection of cues is central to moral expertise. 
That is, detecting in advance the likely unfolding of a potentially volatile situation 
gives one the opportunity to diffuse that situation before it occurs.  And, surely, 
having the ability to avoid or minimize potential harm must be an important feature 
of moral skill. 
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 As such, we can find a natural place for attending to, identifying, and making 
predictions based upon relevant moral features of a situation in our theory of moral 
expertise. By considering, in a holistic way, what is required for moral action, we can 
see that accurate input selection is required for moral agency. Further, given the 
empirical evidence from sport psychology, we now have a framework for thinking 
about how perceptual skills relating to attention, pattern recognition and 
identification, and early detection of perceptual cues might be relevant for moral 
expertise.  This means that we not only have reason to think that the selection of 
perceptual input is central to moral action but we also have reason to think that the 
development of perceptual skills is the result of practice.    
 
 
4. Some important clarifications and directions for future research  
Of course, moral expertise, even if it is a practical skill, will differ from motor 
expertise in all sorts of ways. In this section, I will forward some cursory 
suggestions for how one ought to think about the kind of perception involved in the 
selection of relevant inputs for moral expertise, and the kinds of features that this 
perception detects. This section is meant to be a preliminary indication of how a 
theory of moral expertise might develop and not a complete theory in itself.  It 
strikes me that the below proposals are worth refining and pursuing to see if their 
initial plausibility can withstand scrutiny. 
One difference between motor expertise and moral virtue that has likely 
already alerted itself to the reader is that in studying sporting skill and input 
detection, the above studies focus almost entirely on visual perception: they 
measure visual fixation, duration, eye-gaze, etc. One worry, then, is the sensory 
modality of perception that is studied in motor expertise may not translate easily or 
straightforwardly to moral expertise.  After all, though vision is likely relevant for 
the detection and identification of many moral situations, it is by no means 
necessary or sufficient.  It is clear that, on the one hand, a visually blind individual 
need not be morally blind and, on the other, perfect vision does not guarantee 
accurate moral perception—a child may have 20/20 vision and still fail to detect the 
relevant features of a moral situation.  
That said, it does seem that various kinds of sensory perception will be 
relevant for detecting moral situations. For example, visually perceiving a particular 
facial expression or gesture often bears on the proper detection and identification of 
moral situations.  And the same goes for audition; for example, hearing a particular 
tone of voice or decibel level of speech is often important for the detecting and 
identifying the unfolding moral situation of a particular kind.  However, as I noted 
above, moral perception is more than visual or auditory perception. I propose that 
we think of the detection, identification, and anticipation of morally relevant 
features as a kind of multi-modal perception. The primary sensory modalities may 
include vision or audition or touch (maybe others, too) but what makes moral 
perception different from more familiar kinds of perception is that moral expertise 
also typically involves emotional perception.  This proposal is very much in line with 
recent theories in moral psychology, which insist that emotions play a central role in 
moral judgments. Such theories have been advocated by philosophers such as Sean 
Nichols73 and Jesse Prinz.74 
 According to Nichols, if we examine the geneology of norms and moral 
restrictions/principles, what we’ll find is that those norms that are supported or 
accompanied by affect, are much more likely to persist. The basic implication of this 
anthropological/historical approach to morality is to show that emotions play a 
crucial role in the propagation and sustainability of morality. That is, the moral 
principles that we accept are very likely underpinned by an affective or emotional 
component. Moreover, it is this component that makes these principles effective 
either in encouraging or discouraging various kinds of behaviors such as helping 
and avoiding harm. 
 In a bolder proposal, Prinz argues that moral judgments not only involve or 
become sustained by emotions but that moral judgments simply are emotional 
attitudes. 75 In order to support this claim, Prinz appeals to, among other things, 
empirical evidence that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral 
judgments. In support of the necessity claim, Prinz appeals to studies of 
psychopathy. As Prinz explains,  
 
Psychopaths are the perfect test case for the necessity thesis, because they are profoundly deficient in negative 
emotions, especially fear and sadness. They rarely experience these emotions, and they have remarkable 
difficulty even recognizing them in facial expressions and speech sounds (Blair et al. 2001, 2002). Psychopaths 
are not amenable to fear conditioning, they experience pain less intensely than normal subjects, and they are not 
disturbed by photographs that cause distress in us (Blair et al. 1997). This suggests psychopathy results from a 
low-level deficit in negative emotions. Without core negative emotions, they cannot acquire empathetic distress, 
remorse, or guilt. These emotional deficits seem to be the root cause in their patterns of antisocial behavior.76 
 
Importantly, empirical studies have shown that psychopaths are incapable of 
distinguishing moral from merely conventional principles.  That is, ‘Psychopaths 
treat the word ‘wrong’ as if it simply meant “prohibited by local authorities”’.77  So, 
for example, a psychopath would treat a claim like ‘killing innocent individuals is 
wrong’ as if it were a judgment of the same nature as ‘in setting a table, it is wrong 
to put the spoon to the left of the plate.’ If we insist that being able to distinguish 
merely conventional rules from moral ones is essential to making authentic moral 
judgments then we should conclude that psychopaths are incapable of making 
moral judgments.78 Further, since this inability to distinguish merely conventional 
from moral principles presumably stems from the emotional impairments 
characteristic of psychopathy, Prinz concludes that emotions are necessary for 
moral judgments. 
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  To argue that emotions are sufficient for moral judgments, Prinz appeals to 
empirical evidence showing that an arbitrary emotional connection between a word 
like “often” and an emotional response of disgust can trigger a negative moral 
judgment or appraisal in individuals who have been hypnotized to associate the 
two. As Prinz explains, in their study, 
 
Wheatley and Haidt (2005) hypnotized subjects to feel a pang of disgust when they heard the 
emotionally neutral word ‘often’. They then presented these subjects with vignettes that either 
contained the word ‘often’ or a synonym. Some of these scenarios describe morally reprehensible 
characters, but others describe characters who are morally admirable. Subjects who are hypnotized 
to feel disgust when they hear the word ‘often’ judge that the morally admirable characters are 
morally wrong when that word appears in the vignettes! This suggests that a negative feeling can 
give rise to a negative moral appraisal without any specific belief about some property in virtue of 
which something is wrong.79 
 
 Prinz goes on to generalize from the finding that the emotion of disgust has been 
shown to be sufficient for moral judgment to the claim that emotional attitudes, in 
general, are sufficient for moral judgments. 
 The position that I’d like to endorse here is more minimal than the one that 
Prinz recommends.  I claim that the evidence above makes it clear that typical moral 
judgments involve an emotional component. However, I’d like to stop short of 
committing to the identity claim that Prinz endorses.  This is because I see nothing 
wrong with allowing that certain moral judgments may be rooted in a purely 
rational basis and, as such, may lack an emotional component. So, for example, one 
may lack the emotional attitude of disgust even if one considers child marriage to be 
morally wrong.  Moreover, I see nothing wrong with allowing that one may 
experience a certain emotional reaction and fail to form the typical moral judgment 
that corresponds to that emotion. One can think of a person raised in a racist culture 
trying to overcome her racism as an example of this. She may feel the emotions that 
usually cause racist judgments (disdain, disgust, etc.) but catch herself feeling those 
emotions and intervene so as not to form the typical judgment about the minority 
group member who has caused this reaction in her.  We should notice that cases like 
these are not ruled out by the empirical evidence that Prinz uses to support his own 
view and, as such, I’d like to remain open to the possibility that such cases are 
possibilities. So, whereas Prinz insists that moral judgments just are emotional 
attitudes, I am relying on the evidence to support the more minimal but plausible 
position that moral judgments generally involve emotional attitudes. 
Further, I see nothing in the above evidence that entails that we must accept 
that moral judgments are always nothing but emotional attitudes. As such, I’d like to 
admit that, typically, moral judgments involve an emotional component but keep 
open what seems to me both a plausible and attractive position that moral 
judgments also involve non-emotional components. For example, it seems likely that 
moral judgments also involve intellectual components that can be provided by a 
moral theory, a set of moral principles, or an understanding of moral concepts.  It 
strikes me as likely that mature adults will often form moral judgments that have 
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both emotional and intellectual components and that the intellectual component is 
not merely one that tracks the causal etiology of the emotional attitude involved in 
the moral judgment.  
 Despite this qualification, I believe that Prinz’s position regarding the nature 
of emotional attitudes is illuminating and useful for the purposes of exploring moral 
expertise as a kind of refined emotional perception.  According to Prinz, emotional 
attitudes are non-cognitive perceptions of bodily changes that are caused by certain 
events, actions or traits. Following Dretske,80 Prinz claims that insofar as these 
bodily changes track certain determinate features of the world, they have 
representational content. That is, emotional states are non-cognitive perceptions of 
the body that represent those events, traits or actions that cause them. So, for 
instance, as Prinz offers, sadness is an emotional attitude that detects loss. And fear 
is an emotional attitude that tracks danger. Insofar as sadness is caused by loss and 
fear caused by danger, these emotions represent loss and danger. The 
representations that regularly cause bodily changes, on Prinz’s account, are 
collected into mental files, or, more precisely, what he calls, ‘calibration files’. 
This way of thinking about emotional attitudes neatly allows for the 
refinement and development of emotional perception.  This is because, according to 
Prinz, emotional perception is evolutionarily rooted but it is not fixed or brute.  That 
is, emotional attitudes can be ‘calibrated’ to track the relevant features of the world 
more or less accurately.  As Prinz writes, ‘Calibration files contain a wide range of 
representations, both cognitive and non-cognitive, and these representations can 
change over the course of cognitive development’.81 
In endorsing the view of emotional perception as a component of moral 
judgment, my claim is that as one practices performing the right actions, at the right 
time, directed at the right persons, etc. what one develops (at the very least) is a 
refined capacity to track morally relevant features of the world via emotional 
perception. That is, through practice, one develops emotional attitudes that are 
calibrated to the relevant moral features of a situation. Refined emotional 
perception of this kind gives us a natural way to think about the improvements in 
attention, identification, and prediction that come with moral expertise. 
To end, by endorsing a view of moral judgment as typically involving an 
emotional component and by relying on Prinz’s view of emotional attitudes as both 
non-cogntitive and representational states that can be calibrated, it should become 
clear how the detection and identification of morally-relevant inputs are refined, 
tuned, honed or calibrated through learning and development. Since we now have a 
way of conceiving of emotional perception as a kind of perception that can be 
refined through practice, this allows us to draw a parallel between motor skill and 
moral expertise. In motor skill, the ability to attend to, detect, locate, identify and 
make predictions on the basis of domain-specific visual features develops through 
practice and is central to motor expertise. Likewise, in moral skill, the ability to 
attend to, detect, locate, identify and make predictions on the basis of domain-
specific emotional features of moral situations develops through practice and is 
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central to moral expertise. As such, we can draw a parallel between refining visual 
perceptual capacities in motor expertise and refining emotional perceptual 
capacities in moral expertise. And this, I hope, gives us a cursory way to frame the 
kinds of suggestions that I’ve been gesturing to throughout the paper. 
 
 
